

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 

INFORMATION FROM

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.

COUNTRY COMMUNIST CHINA

DATE OF Jan. 12-18, 1953  
INFORMATION

SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES

HOW  
PUBLISHED


DATE DIST. 26 Feb 53

WHERE  
PUBLISHEDNO. OF PAGES 

ILLEGIB

DATE  
PUBLISHEDSUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

LANGUAGE



THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE  
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793  
AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-  
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS  
PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Monitored Broadcasts

CPW Report No. 57-A -- COMMUNIST CHINA

(Jan. 12-18, 1953)

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB															
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI															

DISTRIBUTION

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

## SUMMARY

Although Russia is credited with making possible reconversion of charcoal-burning buses to gasoline, the theme of close Sino-Soviet ties is noticeably deemphasized, suggesting that pressure from above impelled the two-months campaign to build Russian prestige, with a collapse of the movement once the pressure was removed.

However, increased emphasis on Korean war problems is noted, with the Resist-America, Aid-Korea organization laying the groundwork for an intensive campaign. More concern is expressed for preferential treatment, and for concessions to women to induce them to work. In the war itself, extravagant claims are made for front-line propaganda, described in detail. Chinese troops are represented as safe, happy, and well-fed, in contrast to the hopelessly miserable U.N. forces, and imminent collapse of American war efforts through home-front pressure is suggested. This confidence in victory probably will act as a lever to force new sacrifices from the burdened Chinese through the coming RAAK drive.

Concessions to private businessmen still are reported, but occasional reminders of the Three and Five Anti's campaigns also act as a threat to induce cooperation. Basic construction receives expanding emphasis, and an illustration of how this drive will affect consumption goods supplies is gathered from an admission that the Northeast Petroleum Administration has "cut its normal purchases in half" to provide equipment for basic construction. Government departments are condemned with growing severity for failing to make demanded personnel transfers.

New efforts are seen to clamp down on cadres, speed up indoctrination, and centralize controls. Shanghai newspapers come under rigid "coordination," centralized radio control grows, and Peking takes over the publication of reading matter in minority languages. Implementation of the People's Congress and local people's assemblies is admitted by Government leaders to be a practical step to make propaganda more effective, as large areas of resistance to Russianization still exist. In the border areas the PLA apparently must carry the burden for some time to come.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION